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Abstract 
We study the impact of dispersions in education (both in student test scores and final educational 
attainment) on earnings inequality, in a country-cohort design. Neo-classical economic theory 
would predict a positive association between skill inequality (as measured in student test scores) 
and earnings inequality, while educational attainment inequality adds little on top of skills 
inequality. A sociological theory of social closure, however, argues that inequality in educational 
attainment is more important than skills inequality in the prediction of earnings inequality. Using 
educational policies as instruments, we find causal effects of skills inequality and educational 
attainment inequality, suggesting that a simple human capital model is insufficient to explain rising 
earnings inequalities. Nevertheless, skills inequality appeared a more important predictor of 
earnings inequality than educational attainment inequality. Some educational policy reforms (like 
public preschool provision or introducing standardised tests) led to reduced educational dispersions, 
and thereby reduced earnings inequality in adulthood.  
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1. Introduction 
 
The relationship between educational distributions and labour market distributions has been at the 
core of economic and sociological research. Society gets increasingly stratified on the basis of 
education. Economic theories and structural-functionalist allies in sociology have explained the 
increased importance of education through increased complexity work and the resulting higher 
demand for higher-level skills. Theories of social closure argue that education is increasingly 
rewarded for other reasons than simply rising demand for skills; education has become a core 
mechanism to create and maintain boundaries between social groups.   
Despite the huge attention for the school-work relationship, the literature has been primarily 
concerned with differences in average educational attainment and achievement and its relationship 
to the average probability to find a higher-class occupation, or earn higher salaries. Much less 
attention has been paid to dispersions in educational distributions, and how these relate to 
dispersions in labour market outcomes such as earnings. This means that dispersions in education 
and in the labour market have been analyzed mostly in isolation. This is unfortunate for both 
scientific and political reasons. From a scientific perspective, the divorced studies of educational 
and earnings inequalities fail to acknowledge that one potential explanation of earnings inequalities 
may be found in the unequal distribution of education and skills. While many studies have related 
the rising earnings inequalities to rising gaps among educational categories (e.g. Goldin and Katz 
2009; Hout 2012), little research has directly examined the dispersion in earnings in relation to the 
dispersion in skills and qualification levels. Moreover, while most studies that examined the 
relationship between education and labour market outcomes focused on educational attainment (e.g. 
in terms of qualification levels of years of schooling attained), recent scholarship argues that the 
quality of education in terms of skill assessments is of greater importance for economic growth than 
the quantity of education in terms of average years of schooling completed (Hanushek and 
Woessmann 2008). It is important to examine the relevance of quality and quantity of education 
also from an inequality perspective. Different theoretical perspectives emphasize different aspects 
of education to be relevant for social stratification. Some theories emphasize the productivity-
enhancing skills that schooling provides, while others put more weight on the formal qualifications 
that provide access to desirable positions. To further scrutinize these different theoretical 
perspectives, it is important to apply them to inequality. It may help us not only to understand who 
gets ahead in the stratification order, but also how societal inequality is affected by inequalities in 
the various elements of education.    
From this perspective it is important to know what is more important for the determination 
of earnings inequality: inequality in skills (student test scores) or inequality in educational 
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attainment? We derive hypotheses from standard neo-classical economics and sociological closure 
theory, which differ in the importance that may be attached to either skills or educational 
attainment. Thus, examining both skills and attainment helps us to understand more about how 
mechanisms about returns to education have contributed to the rising inequality in earnings in many 
societies.  
 From a political perspective it is important to understand the relationships between 
educational and income inequalities because policies that are mainly oriented towards the 
manipulation of educational distributions can have wider repercussions on the social stratification in 
adult life. Furthermore, for political debates it is important to study the effectiveness of policies in 
affecting the dispersions in achievement, and/or in educational attainment.  
  We contribute to a better understanding of the associations between educational policies, 
educational distributions and earnings distributions by combining various datasets. We match 
comparative mathematics achievement data (as indicator of the ‘quality’ of education) with 
educational attainments (as a proxy for the ‘quantity’ of education), labour force participation and 
earnings in the adult population. The match exploits combinations of cohort, country and gender, 
and for each combination we have calculated educational and earnings inequality measures. We 
show that educational inequality (in terms of dispersion) is correlated with earnings inequality thirty 
years later, with ‘quality’ being more relevant that ‘quantity’ in shaping earnings inequality. 
Furthermore, to investigate the importance of educational policies, we have matched these 
population data (combining cohorts and countries) with data on educational policies, including 
policies on compulsory education, school and/or teachers’ autonomy, and tracking age (from Braga 
et al. 2013). We employ instrumental variable models to validate that inequality in education 
(measured in terms of both quality and quantity) affects earnings inequality. In addition, since 
educational inequality responds to educational reforms, we are able to identify some educational 
policies (like later entry into compulsory education or the introduction of standardised tests) capable 
to reduce earnings inequalities once the same cohort is in the labour market.  
As a replication exercise, we match data from a survey conducted in 2000 on 15-year old 
youngsters math test score with the corresponding cohort in the same country 12 years later. For 
both groups of individuals we show that inequality in skills accounts for a significant portion of 
observed earnings inequality.  
 
2. Theoretical background: Educational distributions and earnings distributions 
 
Mechanisms linking education and labour market outcomes 
Page 3 of 38
http://mc.manuscriptcentral.com/ser
Manuscripts submitted to Socio Economic Review
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
29
30
31
32
33
34
35
36
37
38
39
40
41
42
43
44
45
46
47
48
49
50
51
52
53
54
55
56
57
58
59
60
For Peer Review
 4
Education and labour market outcomes are well-known to be strongly correlated: those with more 
schooling and more advanced skill levels have higher earnings, higher occupational status, and 
preferable employment relations than those with less education. Education is therefore generally 
considered as one of the main determinants of the position people take in the social structure.    
 Studies often relate the rising earnings inequalities witnessed in many societies to rising 
returns to educational qualifications (although also within-group inequality has increased). 
According to functionalist sociological theory of modernization, and their allies from neo-classical 
economics, labour market outcomes are increasingly stratified on the basis of education because the 
labour market becomes more complex through technological developments, and rising demand for 
skills increases the price of labour (Bell 1974; Davis & Moore 1945; Goldin & Katz 2009). 
Although this model assumes that rising educational gradients correspond to a rising return on skills 
(due to increased productivity created by skill-biased technological change), empirical research 
typically examines earnings differences between qualification levels. But returns to qualification 
levels could also correspond to other mechanisms why education is rewarded. In particular, the 
sociological theory of social closure argues that qualifications are rewarded for reasons other than 
productivity-enhancing skills (Van de Werfhorst 2011; Di Stasio et al. 2016). Following Solga 
(2014) we therefore consider it relevant to study the relationship between educational distributions 
and income inequality from both the neo-classical/functionalist and closure perspectives.  
 The neo-classical/functionalist model assumes education is rewarded because of the skills 
that are associated to it. Within neo-classical economics, there are two arguments that call for a very 
strong relationship between skills and educational attainment. First, skills could be produced in the 
educational system, as standard human capital theory argues. Second, education sorts on skills that 
students already have before they go into schooling (Weiss 1995). Both perspectives hold that 
reward on the basis of education is efficient as education indicates the skills that people hold. The 
neo-classical model holds that sorting in education on the basis of ability is perfect, where further 
investments in education depend on expected returns and the ability students have to complete 
higher levels of schooling. So observing a person’s skills should be highly informative of the 
human capital s/he commands.  
The baseline argument of the closure perspective, by contrast, is that formal or informal 
rules are governing the placement of people in the stratification order. This perspective originates 
from a Weberian theory on stratification, which holds that advantaged groups search for ways to 
secure their advantage by norms and regulations (Brown 1995). Informal norms can, for instance, 
correspond to the cultural background of people of different qualification levels fitting different 
sorts of occupations. High-level occupations are allocated to graduates from tertiary education not 
only because they have skills to carry out the tasks, but also because they display affinity with the 
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dominant cultural codes in society that is required to perform well in those functions (Bourdieu 
1998; Rivera 2012). Formal regulations correspond to closure practices that govern the formal 
accessibility of occupations, like licensing and certification (Bol 2014; Weeden 2002). The supply 
of workers can then be controlled, creating rents in the form of earnings above the market value of 
skills. As a summary of the closure perspective, Brown (2001: 20) writes, “credential requirements 
for jobs are less concerned with concrete work skills than with demanding that recruits hold similar, 
school-taught cultural dispositions to incumbents of positions”. Importantly, the closure perspective 
holds, just like the functionalist/neo-classical perspective, that education is increasingly rewarded in 
the labour market, but for different reasons.  
In line with closure theory, neo-institutionalists furthermore argue that the societal change in 
relation to the ‘schooled society’ involves more than a simple school-to-work allocation process 
(Baker 2014; Meyer and Ramirez 2000). The institutionalization of education is partly based on a 
‘myth’ concerning the relationship between educational attainment and individual marginal 
productivity (Schofer and Meyer 2005). Because institutionalization also implies a social 
construction of the value of education, an empirically demonstrable value of education can emerge 
because we all believe in the myth and organize society on this basis. The neo-classical economic 
model can be criticised from this perspective because educational earnings returns are both the 
outcome of study and the (faulty) mechanism of marginal productivity explaining it.   
In order to differentiate between neo-classical and closure models of stratification, it is 
essential to incorporate separate measures of skills (as indicator of the quality of education) and 
educational attainment (as indicator of the quantity of education). Neo-classical economists show 
that skills explain a large fraction of why education is rewarded on the labour market (Blau and 
Kahn 2005; Leuven et al. 2004). Critics of the neo-classical model, however, have demonstrated 
that educational gradients in earnings are only marginally reduced when skills are taken into 
account (Bowles and Gintis 2002).  
 
Education inequality and earnings inequality 
The positive relationships between cognitive skills, educational attainment and earnings imply that 
earnings inequality can be partly attributed to dispersions in educational quality and quantity. Blau 
and Kahn (2005) claim that the greater dispersion of cognitive test scores in the United States plays 
a part in explaining higher U.S. wage inequality. Competences also provide an autonomous 
contribution to observed inequality, conditional on identical school attainment (Green and Riddell 
2003). Freeman and Schettkat (2001) show that the U.S. are characterised by greater inequality in 
adult competences than Germany, which is reflected in greater inequality in earnings. Using a wider 
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country coverage and the more recent PIAAC data, Solga (2014) confirmed a positive relation 
between inequality in adult competences and income inequality.  
Some studies have linked student competences assessed during high school with income 
inequality. Bedard and Ferrall (2003) show a positive association between inequality in 
mathematics performance during high school and wage inequality in adulthood of the same birth 
cohorts. Moreover, the association was hardly affected by including trade union density as an 
indicator of (wage-compressing) wage centralization. Busemeyer (2015) examined skill inequality 
in terms of the slope by parental background, rather than in terms of dispersions. No statistical 
association was found between inequality of educational opportunity in PISA test scores among 15-
year-old students and income inequality taken from OECD data.  
The two theoretical approaches summarized above have a different perspective on the 
relevance of competences and educational attainment. According to the neo-classical/functionalist 
model, educational attainment strongly overlaps with measured skills, so that inequality in skills 
should be more strongly predictive of the level of earnings inequality in adulthood than inequality 
in attained years of schooling (hypothesis 1). According to the closure theory, by contrast, the 
possession of skills is not sufficient to achieve high incomes. Skills are only useful to the extent that 
they have been ‘translated’ in attainment levels that are used to govern the allocation of workers to 
the occupational structure. Controlling for inequality in educational attainment, skills inequality 
should therefore be of minor importance for the explanation of earnings inequality in adulthood 
(hypothesis 2).  
 The two hypotheses follow from very strong versions of the neo-classical/functionalist and 
closure perspectives. In the strict version of the neo-classical/functionalist theory a person’s human 
capital is assumed to perfectly overlap with his/her measured cognitive skills (due to reduced cost 
and/or increased productivity for abler individuals), and the strict version of the closure theory 
assumes that the only reason that qualification levels are rewarded (conditional on skills) is that 
informal and formal rules are used. Although these are strong assumptions, they help us to interpret 
the relative weight of skills inequality and educational attainment inequality. So, if skills inequality 
would be highly predictive of earnings inequality in adulthood, even after including attainment 
inequality in the empirical model, it is unlikely that closure theory is fully able to explain rising 
earnings inequalities in Western societies. Likewise, if attainment inequality is predominant in the 
explanation of earnings inequality, the least we can say is that the ‘cognitive component of 
schooling’ does not fully explain how educational inequality is associated to earnings inequality 
(see also Bowles and Gintis 2002 for a similar argument).  
There is another justification for our rather stringent interpretation of these broad theoretical 
approaches. Rising earnings inequalities could be explained from a neo-classical educational 
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perspective by either an increase of the price for the skills people have, or a change in the labour 
supply at different education levels. Both could work in the same, or in opposite directions (Goldin 
and Katz 2009). For instance, the price for skills may go up due to technological innovation 
(increasing education gaps), while the supply of higher levels of education also increases 
(counterbalancing this increase). However, it is plausible that people adjust their educational 
attainment in response to changing demand more easily than their level of skills. If technology 
grows, this may lead more easily to behavioural adjustments leading to higher participation rates in 
(tertiary) education than to higher skill levels. This could imply that the effect of skill inequality on 
earnings inequality more directly captures skill prices (largely unaffected by the conflation of 
supply), while the effect of educational attainment inequality also captures other, non-human capital 
returns to education. Educational attainment inequality may even reduce (because the dispersion in 
educational attainment reduces with expansion, Meschi and Scervini 2014) while the skill price 
(and earnings inequality) increases, leading to stronger effects of skill inequality on earnings 
inequality in the neo-classical model.  
 
Education policies and inequalities 
While a positive association is expected between educational and income distributions, it is 
worthwhile to be more explicit on how educational distributions are affected by education policies. 
Some of the cited studies have looked at education policies. Busemeyer (2015) for instance, showed 
that the size of the vocational education and training sector and public spending on higher education 
were negatively associated to the level of income inequality in a country (see also Busemeyer and 
Iversen 2012). However, that study has not examined the influence of policies on educational 
distributions, as one avenue through which income inequality might be affected.   
 Unlike previous studies, we approach educational policies as instruments of educational 
distributions, so we can estimate the causal effects of educational distributions on earnings 
inequality. Using educational policies as instruments is desirable because different policies can 
create different skill equilibria and earnings distributions (Iversen and Stephens 2008). As recent 
contributions to the Varieties of Capitalism field emphasize, educational policies can differ with 
regard to the stratification and de-commodification they create in the educational system, which 
results in varying levels of educational inequality (Busemeyer 2015). From a methodological 
perspective, instruments are desirable as there is potential endogeneity, since more talented 
individuals may possess higher level of competences (as well as achieve higher educational 
attainments) and obtain higher earnings. In the absence of credible instruments, it is hard to accept a 
causal interpretation of previous results.  
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 The impact of policies on educational distributions have been widely studied by now 
(Brunello and Checchi 2007; Hanushek and Woessmann 2011; Rindermann and Ceci 2009). 
Examples of policies that are associated to inequalities are the provision of pre-school education 
(Rindermann and Ceci 2009; Schütz et al. 2008; Heckman 2006), standardised testing (Horn 2009), 
tracking age (Bol et al. 2014), school accountability (Hanushek and Raymond 2004; Jennings and 
Sohn 2014) and the length of compulsory education (Leuven et al. 2010; Meschi and Scervini 
2014). We focus on these same policies, which also enables us to study the indirect impact of these 
policies on earnings inequality.  
Because we treat policies as instruments for educational distributions, we do not pay 
attention to other (labour market, welfare) policies that affect earnings inequality. Such policies are 
less important for the production of educational inequalities, unless one sees this from an 
intergenerational perspective (because welfare policies affect the economic resources of parents). 
Educational policies can also be endogenous to educational inequalities, since government can be 
induced to change the organisation of the educational system by observing increasing inequality in 
achievements and/or attainments. Braga et al. (2013) tested the exogeneity of educational reform 
measures by regressing current values of the reforms against past values of the inequality in 
schooling, finding no statistical association. They also showed that educational reforms correlate 
with the left-right inclination of governments, and provided IV estimation where variations in 
educational reforms (induced by electoral changes) caused changes in educational inequality. It 
should, however, be acknowledged that education policies can also be part of larger constellations 
of agreements between the state and employer and employee organizations, including labour market 
policies (Busemeyer 2015; Iversen and Soskice 2001). For our analysis this poses less of a problem, 
as we are not aiming to endogenize education policies, but educational distributions.  
 
3. Empirical strategy 
 
In the absence of cross-nationally comparative individual-level longitudinal data with school-age 
competences, schooling attainment and further labour market careers we pursue an alternative 
strategy of country/cohort analysis, matching aggregate inequality measures of competences, 
schooling and earnings based on the birth year of the relevant cohort. We use data for multiple 
cohorts born since 1950, observed at various ages.  
By indicating with ( )xI  a generic inequality indicator, we study the how the inequality in y  
(earnings) will depend on the inequality in both quality q  (ability tests) and quantity h  (educational 
attainment).   
 ( ) ( ) ( ) jtjtjttjjt qIhIyI ω+β+α+δ+δ=  (1) 
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where jδ  and tδ  are country/cohort/survey fixed effects capturing any other sort of systemic 
earnings inequality variation beyond education, while α  and β  measure the association between 
(the distribution of) various dimensions of human capital (quantity and quality) and earnings 
inequality. If h  and/or q  are measured well in advance with respect to y  (in our case h  is 
measured at the end of schooling by the maximal educational attainment, q  is measured at the age 
of 14 or 15, while y  is measured alternatively at the ages of 28, 44 and 59), one is tempted to 
provide a causal interpretation of statements like “a reduction in inequality in test scores reduces 
income inequality by a magnitude β ”. However, unobservable components at country level (like 
competitiveness, solidarity, ethnic fractionalisation and so on) may drive both dimension of 
inequality, leading to biased estimates of the relevant coefficients. Accounting for this possibility, 
one can resort to an instrumental variable strategy to estimate equation (1) leading to 
 
 
( )
( )
( ) ( ) ( )



ω+β+α+δ+δ=
+′++=
+′++=
jtjtjttjjt
jtjtjtjjt
jtjtjtjjt
qIhIyI
gccqI
eaahI
ˆˆ
Zd
Zb
 (2) 
 
where the educational inequality measures in equation (1) are replaced by their projections obtained 
from a vector of (supposedly) exogenous variables pertaining reforms in the educational sectors 
affecting the relevant birth cohorts.1 We thus exploit both geographical and temporal variations in 
educational reforms by government to obtain unbiased estimates of the causal impact of educational 
inequality on earnings inequality.  
 
4. Dataset 1: IMS-ECHP-SILC and educational reforms 
Data on students’ competences are obtained from three early surveys on mathematical competences 
of (around) 14-year-old students conducted in past decades (FIMS 1964 was the First International 
Mathematics Study testing mathematical competences of students born in or around 1950; the 
Second (SIMS 1980-82) tested students born in or around 1966 and the Third (TIMSS 1995) tested 
students born in or around 1981, all assumed to be nationally representative).2 We thus start with a 
population composed by three birth cohorts, born in 1950, 1966 and 1981 respectively, in countries 
that participated to the student assessment surveys. Data on schooling and labour market outcomes 
for the same cohorts can be obtained from representative samples of the corresponding population 
at later stages. However, if observed at the same point in time, we would be confounding cohorts 
and age effects (namely, older cohorts may be characterised by higher (possibly lower, due to 
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natural decay) level of competences and earnings inequalities). For this reason, we use two 
available datasets existing at European level and reporting data on earnings and incomes: the 
European Community Household Panel (ECHP), which started in 19943, and the European Union 
Statistics on Income and Living Conditions (EU-SILC), which started in 2004 and is updated 
annually.4 We selected the 1994 ECHP wave because it was the earliest available, while we resorted 
to the 2009 SILC wave because it was the first survey reporting consistent information on gross 
incomes for all participating countries. In table 1 we show the matching rule we followed to 
construct our dataset. Take for example the students born in 1950 and tested in 1964 among others 
in six European countries (Belgium5, Finland, France, Germany, Netherlands and United Kingdom). 
The same birth cohort can be observed in the labour market around the age of 44 in 1994, thanks to 
ECHP (Finnish data not available, since Finland entered in 1996), and again at age 59, using the 
SILC data. The same logic applies to the other cohorts. 
 
[Table 1 here] 
 
Labour earnings data are obtained summing earnings from dependent employment and earnings 
from self-employment, and excluding cases of negative values. In the ECHP all values (except 
France) are net of taxes, while in the SILC we use gross values (this is one reason to add a survey 
fixed effect). Negative earnings values exist in the case of self-employed, they have been converted 
into zeros in order to allow the calculation of inequality. Individuals without earnings (housewives, 
unemployed, out of labour force) report zero values, but have been retained in our sample since 
labour market participation is potentially endogenous and definitely correlated with educational 
attainment and possession of competences. 
Years of education have been computed from maximum educational attainment according to 
the ISCED classification converted into years by using legal duration.6 Mathematics test scores, the 
only domain that has been tested since the 1964 FIMS, are calculated for the FIMS, SIMS and 
TIMSS data based on the number of correct answers to multiple-choice items.7 In order to partially 
account for gender composition and increase the degrees of freedom, we have computed these 
inequality measures separately for males and females. 
The country inequality measures (averaged over genders) are reported in table A1. Overall 
we possess an unbalanced panel covering 20 countries with 82 observations (41 country/cohort × 2 
genders). Figure 1 shows the plot of the relevant data for the 20 countries, while table 2 reports the 
descriptive statistics for the relevant variables. We can observe that there is a modest positive 
correlation (0.18) between inequality in quantity and inequality in quality of education for the 
country/gender/cohort cell available (north-west panel).8 Inequality in the quality of education has a 
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modest (but insignificant) correlation with earnings inequality (computed over employees – north-
east panel), while there is no bivariate correlation between inequality in educational attainment and 
earnings inequality. In the last south-east panel we contrast earnings inequality for dependent 
employees and for total employment. The correlation among the two inequality measures is 
considerable (0.43).  
 
[Table 2 here] 
 
Potentially confounding factors are controlled by means of corresponding dummies (gender, birth 
year, age, country and survey). For gender this refers to the share in the data of men in the country-
cohort-age group.   
 
[Figure 1 here] 
 
 
We do not have a priori about which is the most appropriate economic inequality measure to be 
used in this analysis, since each index captures different dimensions of the underlying distributions. 
We have decided to focus on the Gini index as our relevant measure of inequality, since it is the 
most commonly used measure for income inequality. Table 3 shows results with fixed effects, still 
without examining education policies. The table shows positive effects of inequalities in quantity 
and quality of human capital (see columns (1) and (2) of table 3). Clustering errors weakens the 
statistical significance of inequality in test scores (columns (3) and (4) of table 3).  
If we restrict the analysis to individuals with positive earnings values, part of the effect of 
educational inequalities is absorbed by the sample selection (especially among women and older 
birth cohorts). As we see from columns (5) and (6) of table 3, both inequality in test scores and 
inequality in educational attainment (measured across individuals with positive earnings) lose 
magnitude. This is an indication that whenever we measure earnings inequality we face a huge 
problem of self-selection into the labour market, which we are unable to properly model in this 
context. For this reason, we stick to the solution of including all the relevant population, imputing 
zero earnings when they are out of the labour market.9  
 
 
[Table 3 here] 
 
Overall, the magnitude of the coefficient on inequality in test scores oscillates between 1 and 1.7, 
while the coefficient on inequality in years of education remains in the range of half of it, between 
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0.5 and 0.8.10 In terms of elasticities (measured at sample means), earnings inequality measured by 
Gini concentration indices would exhibit an elasticity of 0.61-0.69 with respect to inequality in test 
scores and 0.21-0.22 with respect to inequality in years of education (computed from columns (3) 
and (4) of table 3). 
Table 4 presents the instrumental variable estimation. We use the measures of educational 
reforms constructed by Braga et al. (2013) covering various stages of schooling. If we exclude age 
of begin/end of compulsory education and age of first tracking, the majority of these reform 
measures are scale-free, because they count the number (and direction) of policy intervention.11 
Table A2 in the Appendix presents the areas for which information is available, while figure A1 in 
the same Appendix plots the cross-country averages of these educational reform measures for one 
area of reform. 
For ease of comparison in columns (1) and (2) of table 4 we have reproduced columns (3) 
and (4) of previous table 3. In columns (3) and (4) we present the corresponding IV estimations 
using a 2SLS estimator, while in columns (5) and (6) a GMM estimator is proposed (which allows 
for heteroskedasticity of the errors and is more convenient when the number of instruments largely 
exceed the number of supposedly endogenous variables). The bottom part of the table reports the 
first stage coefficients of the regression of the endogenous variables onto the instruments 
represented by measured reforms. Starting with first stage coefficients signs and significance, we 
notice that inequality in years of education is reduced in countries that expanded pre-primary 
education or postponed the beginning age for compulsory education, while the school leaving age 
seems to have a counterintuitive positive correlation. Postponing the age at which students have to 
choose the secondary school track (wherever the educational system is stratified, like in Austria, 
Germany, Italy and the Netherlands) seem to increase both inequalities in schooling and test 
scores.12 On the contrary, strengthening the standardisation of national educational systems through 
the introduction of student testing is associated to a reduction of inequality. Finally, consistent with 
the results of Braga et al. (2013), increasing schools/teachers and universities autonomy reinforce 
their potential competitiveness, at the expenses of increased educational inequality. Similar patterns 
are observed in the case of competence inequality. The statistical significance of these effects relies 
on the method utilised to estimate the variance-covariance matrix: while educational reforms remain 
significant for test score inequality under both IV estimators, they tend to lose significance in the 
case of attainment inequality when passing to GMM method of estimation.13 Using the predicted 
inequalities in quantity and quality of education as regressors for earnings inequality, we observe 
that their coefficients lose statistical significance in comparison with OLS, while rising in 
magnitude in the case of schooling inequality. As long as educational reforms are reasonable 
exogenous instruments (which is formally tested as robustness check in Braga et al. 2013), these 
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values can be interpreted as causal impacts.14 Looking at column (6), we may say that OLS 
estimates for test score inequality were upward biased, while the opposite situation occurs for 
schooling inequality, which now becomes more relevant. In terms of elasticities, the two 
dimensions of educational inequalities get closer (0.57 for test score inequality and 0.36 for 
schooling inequality, both computed from column (6) of table 4 at sample means).  
 
[Table 4 here] 
 
 
Table 5 summarises the policy implications which can be inferred by the use of instrumental 
variables. This is done in two ways, by directly estimating a reduced form (where ( )yI  is directly 
regressed onto the reform variables vector Z) and by computing the overall impact of educational 
reforms onto earnings inequalities.15 Most of these effects are consistent with the previous 
literature: reinforcing early (pre)schooling, delaying the beginning age for compulsory education, 
reinforcing educational standardisation by introducing standardised test scores, all reforms yield a 
reduction in earnings inequalities observed many years later in the labour market. On the contrary, 
increasing teachers’ autonomy (in the selection of teaching contents), reinforcing school 
accountability and/or boosting university autonomy widen earnings differentials. According to the 
reduced form estimation, two additional reforms (increasing the years of education and delaying the 
tracking) come out statistically insignificant with respect to earnings inequalities.  
 
[Table 5 here] 
 
In order to visualise the magnitude of these impacts, in figure 2 we have plotted the reduced form 
coefficients (column 1 of table 5) multiplied by one standard deviation change of the reform 
variables. The units of the horizontal axis of figure 2 are to be interpreted as Gini points. Results are 
strongly consistent with the findings of Braga et al. (2013): some reforms are effective in reducing 
earnings inequality, in particular the expansion of public pre-primary education. Braga et al. (2013) 
call these “inclusive” policies, while Busemeyer (2015) uses a slightly different conceptualization 
of de-commodification. Other reforms are effective in raising earnings inequality, via increased 
variability in both dimensions of human capital in the relevant population. These policies are 
“selective” because they increase the degree of competition among educational institutions (Braga 
et al. 2013); while in Busemeyer’s (2015) approach these policies would be a mixture of 
commodified (marketised) and stratified policies. Results are almost identical when considering 
total earnings.  
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[Figure 2 here] 
 
 
Overall, our results do not reject our hypothesis that inequality in education affects inequality in 
earnings along two dimensions, quality and quantity. In addition, we have also shown that 
inequality in quality (as measured by student test scores) and inequality in quantity (as measured by 
years of schooling) respond to educational policies.  
 
5. Dataset 2: PISA-PIAAC  
 
One may suspect that previous results are driven by confounding factors, not properly accounted by 
country/year fixed effects, since we are considering quite different birth cohorts. In order to check 
the consistency of previous results with respect more homogenous populations, we have performed 
a different exercise on more recent surveys. We consider an adult population to which we impute 
competences measured when they were young, showing first that their current earnings are (weakly) 
correlated to past (and current) competences, and second that inequality in current earnings is 
correlated to either past or current inequality in competences, as in the previous exercise. In 
practice, we have taken the first PISA survey conducted in 2000 on 15-year-old students.16 These 
students are aged 27 in 2012 when another survey on the adult population (aged between 16 and 65) 
was conducted.17 The latter survey contains information on earnings, schooling and level of 
competences measured at the time of the survey. Thanks to the background information available in 
both surveys (gender, foreign born, highest parental education, books at home),18 we can identify 48 
“types” in each of the 20 countries taking part to both surveys (numbers of individual in each 
surveys are reported in table A3). When looking at the distribution of the background information in 
the two surveys (see table 6) we notice that the foreign born population share has increased between 
the two surveys, while parental education and books at home tend to be similarly distributed. 
 
[Table 6 here] 
 
We impute the PISA test results by type to the individual-level PIAAC data. Imputed mean 
competences are obviously correlated with currently measured proficiency (0.46), which in turn is 
also correlated with schooling and labour market participation.19 In table 7 we present two groups of 
estimates according to the dependent variable which is available: for a subset of 15 countries the 
hourly wage is available as a continuous variable; for the largest set of 20 countries the earnings is 
only available in decile. As a consequence, columns 1 to 3 of table 7 presents OLS estimates, while 
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columns 4 to 6 utilises an order probit estimator: the coefficients are therefore only comparable in 
terms of sign and significance, but not of size. 
 
[Table 7 here] 
 
The first model considers quantity (years of schooling)20 and contemporaneous quality (proxied by 
numeracy test score, computed as mean of ten plausible values) of education: both are positively 
correlated to earnings, but the former dominates in terms of magnitude. In the restricted dataset of 
15 countries, we find that the average PISA score of a person’s type is not significantly correlated 
to average earnings in adulthood. Models 4-6, covering 20 countries, show that adult competences, 
high-school competences and years of education all are directly and significantly associated to 
earnings.  
 
[Figure 3 here] 
 
The various inequality measures are presented in figure 3. The strongest correlation is between 
inequality in schooling and inequality in current competences (south-west quadrant), because the 
latter are clearly cumulated following the permanence in school. However current competences are 
also correlated with competences when in school (north-west quadrant). But we have to remind that 
inequality in competences when young is an underestimate of actual inequality (since in the current 
exercise it comprises only the between-group component). This may explain its low correlation 
with schooling (south-west quadrant). The raw data do not present (unconditional) correlation 
between inequality in achievements and inequality in earnings (south-east quadrant). 
Moving to the replication of the inequality model, the estimates referred to the largest 
dataset are reported in table 8. Column 1 of table 8 regresses the inequality on earnings (computed 
over relevant deciles for 20 countries) onto inequality of schooling and inequality in current 
competences for the relevant age cohort (25-29 year old); column 4 replicates the same structure 
extending the sample to a larger age cohort. In both cases inequality of current competences has a 
higher correlation with earnings inequality. However, if we replace current with (imputed) past 
competences (columns 2 and 5), the correlation becomes insignificant for the younger cohort, while 
it retains significance and magnitude for the largest sample.21 Finally we include both measures of 
quality of education (past and current competences) in addition to quantity of education in columns 
3 and 6, but the effect of current competences dominates over the effect of past ones, which does 
not come out significant. So, while the earlier analysis pointed to stronger effects of skills 
inequality than of attainment inequality, the present analysis shows that contemporary skills 
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inequality is more strongly associated to earnings inequality than skills inequality during the high 
school years. Yet, the fact that (adult) competences are more predictive of earnings inequality than 
attainment inequality confirms our findings on multiple cohorts.  
 
[Table 8 here] 
 
6. Conclusions and discussion 
 
We studied the relationship between educational inequality and earnings inequality. Adopting a 
framework in which educational distributions have both a qualitative and a quantitative dimension, 
with quality referring to student performance on standardised tests, and quantity referring to the 
attained level of education, we perform two exercises where we examine the correlation existing in 
the available data using two alternative strategies of matching different datasets. In both exercises 
we find that inequality in quality of education affects inequality in earnings, even controlling for 
inequality in quantity (proxied by schooling). And the effect of quality is stronger than the effect of 
attained level. We employed instrumental variable models using information on educational 
reforms. Exploiting cross-country and cross-year variations in the policies, we are able to show that 
educational reforms have an effect on the distribution of the quality and the quantity of education. 
 Interpreting these results from different theoretical perspectives concerning how educational 
distributions are related to changing earnings inequalities, our findings are more consistent with a 
human capital/functionalist explanation than with an explanation derived from closure theory. 
Based on the alliance between human capital and functionalist theories, that hold that education is 
increasingly rewarded because of the skills that are needed in today’s economies, a stronger effect 
of skill inequality is expected (as we found). Closure theory would hold that earnings inequality can 
only be explained by educational factors to the extent that educational performance is translated in 
educational attainment. Skills inequality should have a minor role once educational attainment 
inequality is held constant (opposite to what we found). Nevertheless, also educational attainment 
inequality had an independent effect on earnings inequality, which does support the claim that the 
contribution of education to explaining earnings inequality is not restricted to a human 
capital/functionalist model. In line with closure theory, educational attainment inequality has an 
independent effect on earnings inequality in most of our models.  
 One issue that we have not explicitly dealt with, but is potentially important for our findings, 
is within-group inequality. It is well-known that the rising earnings inequality cannot fully be 
attributed to rising inequalities between educational categories (supported in our analyses), because 
also within-group inequality is rising. If the within-education-group inequality is strongly 
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overlapping with measured skills, then this could explain why we find stronger skill effects (which 
would still be consistent with our interpretation of the neo-classical/functionalist model).22  
Note that the human capital/functionalist perspective fares better to explain associations 
between inequalities, but this does not mean that human capital theory also fares better to explain 
average earnings. Our analysis showed that educational attainment is strongly correlated with 
average earnings even after holding constant on (adult) competences. Following the approach by 
Bowles and Gintis (2002) this would point to relatively weak evidence for a human capital 
interpretation of how mean earnings are determined.  
 In line with earlier studies (Bedard and Ferrall 2003; Solga 2014), our results demonstrated 
that dispersions in educational outcomes are associated to dispersions in incomes. This central 
finding has important policy implications. Even if income policies have started to include an 
orientation towards education, our results more explicitly call attention for educational distributions 
as a cause of income inequality. While governments are increasingly concerned with students’ 
performance in international tests, these concerns are mostly motivated by an efficiency concern of 
promoting economic growth. Our results would suggest that policy makers who are concerned 
about the growing income inequality in most Western societies should more explicitly incorporate 
educational distributions into their agenda setting. Education policy and income policy go hand in 
hand. Our approach has however limitations, since we cannot consider life-cycle implications of 
changes in current distributons of educational inequality. Due to the lack of longitudinal data we are 
unable to assess whether measured inequality in current earnings will expand or contract with years. 
Given existing evidence on the differential decay of competences by educational attainment, we 
suspect that inequality in earnings may increase overtime. But this is topic for future research.  
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1
 It is common procedure when there is more than one suspected endogenous variable to regress 
them on all exogenous variables and all instruments, since there is no statistical test indicating 
which instrument is more appropriate for which variable. In principle we could have selected some 
instruments as more theoretically appropriate for either inequality in skills or in education, but we 
would have not been able to reject alternative models. 
2
 The micro-data on the second and third surveys (the first one is only publicly accessible on paper) 
are accessible through the International Association for the Evaluation of Educational Achievement, 
IEA, at www.iea.nl.    
3
 http://epp.eurostat.ec.europa.eu/portal/page/portal/microdata/echp.  
4
 http://epp.eurostat.ec.europa.eu/portal/page/portal/microdata/eu_silc 
5
 Belgian data are available for the Francophone and Flemish communities separately, but the same 
does not apply in the case of earnings data, therefore we were forced to consider Belgium as a 
unique entity. 
6
 In order to account for potential country differences in retention rates, we faced the problem of 
attributing a standard duration (in years) of the maximal educational attainment. We have obtained 
an estimate of median duration of studies by using the individual age of leaving school (variable 
AGEDU in ECHP or variable PE030 “Year when highest level of education was attained” in SILC), 
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and then we have assigned 7 years for ISCED=1, 10 years for ISCED=2, 13 years for ISCED=3, 15 
years for ISCED=4 and 18 years for ISCED=5 in SILC. Corresponding values are 8 for EDU=1,  12 
for EDU=2 and 17 for EDU=3 in ECHP.  
7
 Although since 1995, item response theory has been used to measure five plausible values of the 
true mathematics performance, for the earlier cohorts this was not possible. In TIMSS 1995 the 
correlation between our test score and the five plausible values is, in all five cases, 0.89. For reasons 
of comparability we chose to operationalize math in the same way for all three cohorts.  
8
  One may notice that the inequality in years of education has lower values than inequality in test 
scores. This may partly be attributed to the fact that education is computed on a group-aggregate 
variable (standard duration for educational attainment) while test score is computed on a (bounded) 
continuous variable. Thus our inequality measure on quantity has lower mean and variance 
(corresponding to the between-group component) than the inequality measure on quality; other 
things constant the former should obtain a higher regression coefficient than the latter when 
correlated to inequality in earnings. 
9
 As further robustness check we estimated our model separately for men and women, retaining 
some statistical significance for inequality in years of education, but losing it for inequality in tests 
score. But the relaiability of this check is limited, since country/cohort/survey fixed effects use 27 
out of 41 degrees of freedom. 
10
 This is only partially related with the different scales of measurement of inequalities in quantity 
and quality of human capital. If we were to replace the coefficients of column 5 in table3 with beta 
coefficients (i.e. standardizing each variable), we would obtain a coefficient of 0.55 for inequality in 
quality and 0.27 for inequality in quantity. 
11
 We can look at the sign and the statistical significance of the estimated correlation between 
inequality in education and educational reforms, whereas when considering the magnitude we 
should distinguish according to whether we are dealing with step-dummies or continuous variables 
12
 This latter effect contradicts standard findings in the literature on determinants of test scores (see 
for example Hanushek and Woessmann 2005) while it is consistent with the findings for inequality 
in years of education (Brunello and Checchi 2007). 
13
 Notice that all regressions control for country, birth year, age and survey fixed effects, so that 
reform impacts are identified by time variation within the countries and/or gender differential 
impacts within each country/year. 
14
 While we included all policies as instruments for both educational variables, one could also 
partition the policies as instruments for either test score inequality or attainment inequality. As a 
robustness check we did this, with public pre-primary, standardized tests, school accountability and 
teacher autonomy as instruments for math test inequality, and the other reforms as instruments for 
attainment inequality. The results (available upon request) showed significant positive effects of test 
score inequality, and non-significant positive effects of attainment inequality, just like in the 2SLS 
and IV GMM models of table 4. The effect sizes are larger, but that follows from the use of fewer 
instruments. As the choice of instruments for either one of the two educational variables is arbitrary, 
we chose to report the full instrumental variable models.    
15
 We have multiplied the first stage coefficients - from bottom part of table 4 - by the impact of the 
supposedly endogenous variable - from upper part of table 4. Take for example a unitary increase of 
the variable “reform on public pre-primary schooling”: it produces a decrease of skill inequality by 
-0.102 and education inequality by -0.096. The overall decline in dependent employment earnings is 
the given by [−0.102×1.519−0.096×0.730]=−0.225. The effect on total labour earnings is computed 
in a similar way. 
16
 See www.oecd.org/pisa/ . 
17
 The PIAAC, see http://www.oecd.org/site/piaac/  
18
 We cannot use the exact age because 5 countries in PIAAC report age in 5-year brackets. Another 
information we would have liked to use for a coarser match would have been the type of secondary 
school attended, which is available in PIAAC but in PISA is only available starting from 2003. 
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Thus we are left with gender (2) × native/foreign born (2) × highest parental education (recoded in 3 
items for comparability across surveys – this now corresponds to the ECHP classification, indicated 
in footnote 6) × books at home (recoded in 4 items for comparability across surveys), yielding an 
overall number of 48 possible combinations, which are obviously unevenly distributed in the 
population. 
19
 In analogy to the previous exercise, the lack of a proper longitudinal structure of the data forces 
us to consider only between-type inequality in test score of the young population (PISA), because 
we do not have a convincing strategy to reconstruct the within-type inequality of young test score in 
the adult population. It is therefore not surprising the correlation between young and adult test 
scores takes such a low value, since it is just measuring the between-type component.  
20
 This variable is absent for Germany, and has been reconstructed from (median) leaving school 
age. 
21
 Since inequality in test score captures inequality between-types, if there have been relevant 
compositional changes in the distribution of types across age-cohorts within each country (the 
average being cleaned away by the country fixed effect), this may be reflected in the statistical 
significance of inequality of competences at the younger age. 
22
 However, dealing with within- and between-group inequality would require a different research 
design in which educational attainment, skills and luck are included in a structural model.  
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Table 1: Construction of the sample – matching rule 
Birth 
year 
Aged 14 Aged 28 Aged 43-44 Aged 59 
matched 
cohorts/countries 
195
0 
1964 (from FIMS: 
BE,FI,FR,DE,NL,UK) 
1978 
(data not available) 
1994 
(from ECHP1994: 
BE,FR,DE,NL,UK) 
2009 
(from SILC2009: 
BE,FI,FR,DE,NL,UK) 
11 
196
6 
1980 (from SIMS: 
(BE,FI,FR,HU,NL,SE,UK) 
1994 
(from ECHP1994: 
BE,FR,NL,UK) 
2009 
(from SILC2009: 
BE, 
FI,FR,HU,NL,SE,UK) 
 11 
198
1 
1995 (from TIMS: 
AT,BE,CZ,DK,FR,DE, 
GR,HU,IE,IT,LV,NL,NO, 
PT,SK,SI,ES,SE,UK) 
2009 
(from SILC2009: 
AT,BE,CZ,DK,FR,DE, 
GR,HU,IE,IT,LV,NL,NO, 
PT,SK,SI,ES,SE,UK) 
  19 
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Table 2: Descriptive statistics 
Variable Obs Mean 
Std. 
Dev. Min Max 
Gini index on dependent employment gross earnings  
(including non labour force with zero earnings) 
82 0.466 0.110 0.254 0.721 
Gini index on gross earnings  
(including self-employed and non labour force - negative earnings set to 0) 
82 0.433 0.109 0.229 0.698 
Gini index on years of education  
(computed from ISCED attainments) 
82 0.120 0.032 0.072 0.243 
Gini index on dependent employment gross earnings  
(only positive values - excluding unemployed with zero earnings) 
82 0.310 0.061 0.193 0.452 
Gini index on gross earnings  
(including self-employed but excluding non labour force - negative earnings set to 0) 
82 0.316 0.061 0.209 0.472 
Gini index on years of education  
(computed from ISCED attainments - only population with positive earnings) 
82 0.115 0.029 0.074 0.216 
Gini index on math test scores 82 0.175 0.031 0.124 0.244 
age of individuals (when interviewed about occupational status) 82 37.04 11.40 28 59 
reform on public pre-primary schooling 82 0.508 0.445 0 1 
compulsory education (start age) 82 6.024 0.608 5 7 
compulsory education (end age) 82 15.415 1.440 12 18 
tracking age 82 13.476 2.263 10 16 
introduction of standardised test 82 0.341 0.451 0 1 
reform on school accountability 82 0.293 0.458 0 1 
reform on school teacher autonomy 82 0.549 0.494 0 1 
reform of university access 82 0.606 0.430 0 1 
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Table 3: Gross earnings and educational inequality – Gini indices – OLS with 
country fixed effects 
 
 1 2 3 4 5 6 
 
dep.empl. 
earnings 
robust se 
total 
earnings 
robust se 
dep.empl. 
earnings 
clustered se 
total 
earnings 
clustered se 
dep.empl. 
earnings >0 
clustered se 
total 
earnings >0 
clustered se 
inequality in math test scores 
1.631 1.716 1.631 1.716 1.084 1.079 
[0.555]*** [0.546]*** [0.815]* [0.817]** [0.508]** [0.560]* 
inequality in years of education 
(from isced attainments) 
0.849 0.825 0.849 0.825 0.570 0.519 
[0.371]** [0.354]** [0.370]** [0.377]** [0.153]*** [0.194]** 
male component 
-0.076 -0.103 -0.076 -0.103 -0.037 -0.033 
[0.012]*** [0.012]*** [0.013]*** [0.012]*** [0.009]*** [0.010]*** 
Observations 82 82 82 82 82 82 
R-squared 0.84 0.85 0.84 0.85 0.77 0.74 
col.1-2: robust standard errors in brackets - col.3-6: standard errors in brackets clustered by country - constant, 
country, age, birth year and survey controls included - * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 
1% 
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Table 4: Gross earnings and educational inequality – Gini indices – OLS and IV 
estimates with educational reforms as instruments   
 1 2 3 4 5 6 
 OLS IV 2SLS IV GMM 
 
dep.empl. 
earnings 
total 
earnings 
dep.empl. 
earnings 
total 
earnings 
dep.empl. 
earnings 
total 
earnings 
inequality in math test scores 1.631 1.716 1.073 1.269 1.519 1.426 
[0.815]* [0.817]** [1.029] [0.998] [0.579]*** [0.690]** 
inequality in years of education (from 
isced attainments) 
0.849 0.825 1.277 1.544 0.73 1.314 
[0.370]** [0.377]** [1.261] [1.272] [0.843] [0.916] 
Observations 82 82 82 82 82 82 
R-squared 0.84 0.85 0.84 0.83 0.83 0.84 
   1st stage: 1st stage: 
   
Gini math 
test 
Gini yrs 
education 
Gini math 
test 
Gini yrs 
education 
reform on public pre-primary schooling   -0.102 -0.096 -0.102 -0.096 
  [0.020]*** [0.020]*** [0.021]*** [0.072] 
compulsory education (start age)   -0.066 -0.075 -0.066 -0.075 
  [0.012]*** [0.015]*** [0.017]*** [0.041]* 
compulsory education (end age)   0.01 0.009 0.01 0.009 
  [0.002]*** [0.002]*** [0.002]*** [0.005]* 
tracking age   0.009 0.007 0.009 0.007 
  [0.002]*** [0.002]*** [0.003]** [0.055] 
introduction of standardised test   -0.093 -0.074 -0.093 -0.074 
  [0.015]*** [0.014]*** [0.018]*** [0.055] 
reform on school accountability   0.015 0.051 0.015 0.051 
  [0.027] [0.024]* [0.032] [0.075]* 
reform on school teacher autonomy   0.03 0.029 0.030 0.029 
  [0.008]*** [0.009]*** [0.008]*** [0.018] 
reform of university access   0.082 0.038 0.082 0.038 
  [0.012]*** [0.011]*** [0.015]*** [0.037] 
R-squared   0.94 0.77 0.94 0.77 
F test 1st stage [p-value] 
 
 
169.5 
[0.00] 
1932.2 
[0.0] 
29.29 
[0.0] 
1.08 
[0.38] 
Test for overidentifying restrictions 
(Sargan for 2SLS, Hansen for GMM)  
 
10.17 
[0.11] 
9.51 
[0.14] 
10.17 
[0.11] 
9.51 
[0.14] 
Standard errors in brackets clustered by country [2sls] or robust against heteroscedasticity [gmm and 1st stage] –  
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1% - constant, gender, age, country, survey and year 
controls included 
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Table 5: Reduced form multipliers computed from table 4: effects of policies on 
earnings inequality 
 
 
estimated from  
reduced form 
computed from columns 
(5) and (6) of table 4  
 
Gini index 
dependent 
employment 
earnings 
Gini index 
on total 
labour 
earnings 
Gini index 
dependent 
employmen
t earnings 
Gini index 
on total 
labour 
earnings 
reform on public pre-primary schooling -0.346 -0.407 -0.225 -0.272 
[0.078]*** [0.083]***   
compulsory education (start age) -0.200 -0.226 -0.155 -0.193 
[0.053]*** [0.056]***   
compulsory education (end age) 0.001 0.008 0.022 0.026 
[0.007] [0.008]   
tracking age -0.007 -0.005 0.019 0.022 
[0.008] [0.008]   
introduction of standardised test -0.178 -0.232 -0.195 -0.230 
[0.076]** [0.088]**   
reform on school accountability 0.176 0.232 0.060 0.088 
[0.099]* [0.102]**   
reform on school teacher autonomy 0.100 0.125 0.067 0.081 
[0.031]*** [0.032]***   
reform of university access 0.077 0.104 0.152 0.167 
[0.052] [0.055]*   
Observations 82 82   
R-squared 0.83 0.85   
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1% 
Standard errors in brackets clustered by country - constant, gender, age, country, survey  and year controls 
included 
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Table 6. Distribution of population by background information – PISA 2000 and 
PIAAC 2012 
individual characteristics  
(per cent points) 
PISA 2000 
(sample 
weights) 
PIAAC 2012 
Aged 25-29 
(sample 
weights) 
PIAAC 2012 
Aged 20-34 
(sample 
weights) 
male 49.40 50.91 50.21 
female 50.60 49.09 49.79 
Either native-born or native-language at home 98.34 91.99 91.89 
Foreign-born and foreign-language at home 1.66 8.01 8.11 
both parents less than secondary completed 29.38 15.90 16.53 
at least one parent with secondary degree 30.66 43.22 43.74 
at least one parent with college degree 39.96 40.88 39.72 
books at home (when 14 yrs old): 0-10 9.93 12.39 12.21 
books at home (when 14 yrs old): 11-100 40.69 47.96 48.23 
books at home (when 14 yrs old): 101-500 37.63 32.06 32.39 
books at home (when 14 yrs old): >500 11.74 7.60 7.18 
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Table 7. Determinants of (log) earnings – population aged 25-29 - PIAAC 2012 
 1 2 3  4 5 6 
 OLS OLS OLS  oprobit oprobit oprobit 
adult competences 0.001**  0.001***  0.005***  0.004*** 
 [0.000]  [0.000]  [0.001]  [0.000] 
young competences (from PISA cells' 
means) 
 0.001 0.000   0.003*** 0.002*** 
 [0.001] [0.001]   [0.000] [0.000] 
Years of education  
0.036*** 0.041*** 0.036***  0.099*** 0.117*** 0.093*** 
[0.008] [0.008] [0.010]  [0.022] [0.030] [0.023] 
female -0.124*** -0.123*** -0.116**  -0.287*** -0.299*** -0.259*** 
 [0.035] [0.038] [0.039]  [0.068] [0.049] [0.062] 
age -0.203 -0.255 -0.248  0.769 0.586 0.651 
 [0.580] [0.599] [0.596]  [0.691] [0.692] [0.718] 
age² 0.004 0.005 0.005  -0.013 -0.01 -0.011 
 [0.011] [0.011] [0.011]  [0.013] [0.013] [0.013] 
        
Observations 5605 5485 5485  8345 8206 8206 
Countries 15 15 15  20 20 20 
R²-Pseudo R² 0.92 0.919 0.92  0.04 0.04 0.04 
Robust standard errors in brackets *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 errors clustered by country - weighted –  
country fixed effect included 
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Table 8. Inequality in education and earnings – population aged 25-29 and 20-65 - 
PIAAC 2012 
 1 2 3  4 5 6 
VARIABLES 
Gini hourly 
wage decile 
Gini hourly 
wage decile 
Gini hourly 
wage decile 
 
Gini hourly 
wage decile 
Gini hourly 
wage decile 
Gini hourly 
wage decile 
 aged 25-29  aged 20-65 
Gini index years of education 
0.487** 0.657*** 0.484**  -0.209 -0.007 -0.209 
[0.227] [0.212] [0.230]  [0.177] [0.175] [0.177] 
Gini index adult competences – 
PIAAC 2012 
0.676**  0.716**  1.074***  0.981*** 
[0.250]  [0.295]  [0.277]  [0.289] 
Gini index youth competences 
(imputed) - PISA 2000 
 0.395 -0.139   1.025** 0.595 
 [0.370] [0.443]   [0.448] [0.458] 
female population share 
0.033*** 0.032*** 0.033***  0.050*** 0.046*** 0.049*** 
[0.007] [0.008] [0.008]  [0.004] [0.004] [0.004] 
        
Observations 40 40 40  360 360 360 
Countries 20 20 20  20 20 20 
R² 0.467 0.384 0.468  0.65 0.639 0.652 
Robust standard errors in brackets *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 - constant, country controls included –  
columns 4 to 6 also include birth cohort controls 
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Figure 1: Inequality in competences, years of schooling, gross labour earnings (dependent employment and total employment – From 
SILC2009) 
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Figure 2: Earnings inequality impact of educational reforms 
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Figure 3: Inequality in current and past competences, years of schooling and gross labour earnings  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Page 32 of 38
http://mc.manuscriptcentral.com/ser
Manuscripts submitted to Socio Economic Review
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
29
30
31
32
33
34
35
36
37
38
39
40
41
42
43
44
45
46
47
48
49
50
51
52
53
54
55
56
57
58
59
60
For Peer Review
Table A1  – Inequality in earnings and educational attainment – averages across 
gender and age cohorts 
1
st
 number: Gini index on gross total labour earnings of employed –  
2
nd
 number: Gini index on years of education of the same population (from maximal educational 
attainment) –  
3
rd
 number: Gini index on math test score – 
4
th
 number: individuals with positive earnings  
5
th
 number: observations available in the sample 
 birth year  
 1950 1966 1981 Total 
Austria   0.32 0.32 
   0.10 0.10 
   0.15 0.15 
   134 134 
   2 2 
Belgium 0.32 0.25 0.21 0.27 
 0.15 0.12 0.10 0.13 
 0.17 0.15 0.12 0.15 
 202 282 136 620 
 4 4 2 10 
Czech Republic   0.30 0.30 
   0.08 0.08 
   0.15 0.15 
   188 188 
   2 2 
Denmark   0.30 0.30 
   0.11 0.11 
   0.16 0.16 
   97 97 
   2 2 
Finland 0.37 0.35  0.36 
 0.12 0.10  0.11 
 0.21 0.22  0.21 
 363 361  724 
 2 2  4 
France 0.41 0.33 0.26 0.35 
 0.17 0.12 0.10 0.14 
 0.18 0.15 0.14 0.16 
 456 545 246 1247 
 4 4 2 10 
Germany 0.35  0.36 0.35 
 0.12  0.09 0.11 
 0.14  0.16 0.15 
 638  185 823 
 4  2 6 
Greece   0.31 0.31 
   0.11 0.11 
   0.21 0.21 
   168 168 
   2 2 
Hungary  0.35 0.37 0.36 
  0.09 0.09 0.09 
  0.16 0.16 0.16 
  266 234 500 
  2 2 4 
Ireland   0.26 0.26 
   0.10 0.10 
   0.17 0.17 
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   85 85 
   2 2 
 
Italy   0.33 0.33 
   0.11 0.11 
   0.20 0.20 
   421 421 
   2 2 
Latvia   0.39 0.39 
   0.10 0.10 
   0.18 0.18 
   134 134 
   2 2 
Netherlands 0.32 0.28 0.22 0.28 
 0.12 0.11 0.10 0.11 
 0.18 0.18 0.14 0.17 
 406 482 196 1084 
 4 4 2 10 
Norway   0.30 0.30 
   0.11 0.11 
   0.18 0.18 
   107 107 
   2 2 
Portugal   0.33 0.33 
   0.15 0.15 
   0.19 0.19 
   106 106 
   2 2 
Slovak Republic   0.26 0.26 
   0.08 0.08 
   0.16 0.16 
   198 198 
   2 2 
Slovenia   0.30 0.30 
   0.08 0.08 
   0.16 0.16 
   420 420 
   2 2 
Spain   0.31 0.31 
   0.14 0.14 
   0.18 0.18 
   361 361 
   2 2 
Sweden  0.23 0.28 0.25 
  0.09 0.09 0.09 
  0.22 0.16 0.19 
  260 155 415 
  2 2 4 
United Kingdom 0.37 0.36 0.29 0.35 
 0.14 0.13 0.09 0.13 
 0.23 0.24 0.18 0.22 
 387 554 130 1071 
 4 4 2 10 
Total 0.35 0.3 0.3 0.32 
 0.14 0.11 0.1 0.11 
 0.18 0.19 0.17 0.18 
 2452 2750 3701 8903 
 22 22 38 82 
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Table A2  – Areas of educational reform (from Braga et al. 2013) 
area of reform expected impact on schooling 
inequality 
available information  
on reforming activity 
pre-primary 
education 
reduction (through increased educational 
attainment of students from disadvantaged 
background) 
 extending access to (public 
preprimary education 
 making preprimary education 
compulsory 
 raising training requirements for 
preprimary teachers 
expansion of 
compulsory 
education 
reduction (through increased educational 
attainment of students from disadvantaged 
background) 
 compulsory education (start age) 
 compulsory education (end age) 
school tracking 
ambiguous (vocational tracks have shorter 
duration, prevent academic enrolment but 
have lower drop-out rates) 
 raising tracking age 
school autonomy 
ambiguous (adaptability to social 
environment, increased competition in 
presence of centralised control) 
 national testing for other purposes 
than career advancement 
 teacher autonomy in designing 
curricula 
school accountability 
increase (school differentiation, screening 
and sorting of students) 
 national testing for career 
advancement (ISCED 1 and 2) 
teacher qualification 
ambiguous (better quality benefits students 
from poorer backgrounds but allows fro 
greater differentiation) 
 strengthening teacher training 
requirements for primary school 
teachers 
 strengthening teacher training 
requirements for secondary school 
teachers  
university autonomy 
and selectivity 
increase (increased signalling value of 
tertiary education requires a more 
intensive selectivity in university 
admissions)  
 selectivity in admissions 
 financial support to student 
 size of grant/loan component/interest 
rates 
 university autonomy (budget, 
recruitment, organization, logistics, 
course design, self-evaluation, 
planning)  
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Table A3  – Sample size of PISA 2000 and PIAAC 2012 for countries participating to 
both surveys 
country PISA 
2000 
PIAAC 
2012 
Aged 16-
19 
PIAAC 
2012 
Aged 20-
24 
PIAAC 
2012 
Aged 25-
29 
PIAAC 
2012 
Aged 30-
34 
PIAAC 
2012 
Aged 35-
39 
AUSTRIA 2401 424 462 465 464 497 
BELGIUM 3453 432 478 398 442 442 
CANADA 16010 2146 2320 2084 2370 2530 
CZECH REPUBLIC 3002 716 747 702 617 593 
DENMARK 2247 514 542 452 566 614 
FINLAND 2529 409 462 474 534 458 
FRANCE 2371 493 517 536 555 599 
GERMANY 2498 493 542 482 471 448 
IRELAND 2071 332 409 563 795 803 
ITALY 2680 222 301 339 439 588 
JAPAN 2816 356 393 405 492 626 
KOREA, REPUBLIC OF 2759 569 496 600 653 749 
NETHERLANDS 1308 423 456 377 406 460 
NORWAY 2123 480 468 423 490 517 
POLAND 1749 1052 3377 1643 451 447 
RUSSIAN FEDERATION 3573 423 762 463 324 250 
SPAIN 3184 457 512 521 627 714 
SWEDEN 2362 372 443 389 402 413 
UNITED KINGDOM 4748 456 652 758 942 917 
UNITED STATES 1842 343 467 516 502 464 
Total 65726 11112 14806 12590 12542 13129 
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Figure A1 – Country averages of educational reform measures with inclusive orientation (from Braga et al. 2013) 
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